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THE DECLINE OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING:
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES
WENDY PARKER*

This Article examines all published or electronically available
federal district court opinions concerning school desegregation
from June 1, 1992 to June 1, 2002. Based on the resulting analysis,
Professor Parkerargues that the commonly held perception of the
all-powerful districtcourt judge is outdated. Instead of controlling
the process and outcome of the school desegregation cases, district
court judges have ceded to the parties,particularly the defendants,
a great deal of control over both the process and outcome of the
litigation. In doing so, the judges have allayed, to no small degree,
many of the criticisms of their role in school desegregation. Yet
the price of the deference to defendants has been denial to school
desegregation plaintiffs the fulfillment of their rights, even under
the admittedly pro-defendant standards of the Supreme Court.
This Article identifies two Alabama district court judges who are
exceptions to the pattern of deference to defendants. Unlike their
colleagues, these judges have taken an active role in overseeing
their school desegregation cases. Through their efforts, school
desegregation suits are being dismissed, but only after thorough
and relatively successful desegregationefforts.
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INTRODUCTION

Power once defined the school desegregation judge. To many,
district court judges embodied the cause of forced integration through
their orders to bus students and close schools. For this, they were
subject to public vilification and violent threats.' Academics criticized
them for stepping beyond the limits of judicial authority and into the
power reserved to the states and granted to the national executive
2
and legislative branches.
This judicial power also had its proponents, who believed that
judges were skilled "political powerbroker[s]" 3 who "g[a]ve meaning
to our public values."4 Professor Abram Chayes deemed judges
"dominant figures" in his influential public law litigation model that
explained and justified the very different roles the judiciary takes in
overseeing our schools, prisons, police and fire departments, and
public housing.5
1.

See J. ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND 244, 460, 472 (1985); BERNARD

SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY 20-21 (1986);
JOHNSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALABAMA

TINSLEY YARBROUGH,

JUDGE FRANK

58, 99, 152 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715,
715-16 (1978) (criticizing the degree of judiciary involvement in state and local fiscal
matters); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable
Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 664 (1978) (arguing that the separation-of-powers
doctrine imposes limitations on the authority of the federal government over states and
localities in institutional reform litigation); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the
Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1121, 1122-24 (1996) (examining the structural-powers problems with federal courts
exercising remedial powers in structural reform cases).
3. Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 46 (1979); see also Barry Friedman,
When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing FederalRemedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 753
(1992) (noting that lower courts "have taken a highly political approach to the problem of
getting remedies enforced").
4. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1979); see also Peter Shane, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, 64 CHI.KENT L. REV. 531, 550-53 (1988) (arguing that the dominant judicial approach to
constitutional interpretation has been aspirational).
5. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976); Fiss, supra note 4, at 26. By "public law" I refer to cases challenging the
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That power, however, no longer exists today.6 District court
judges have ceded to the parties, particularly school desegregation
defendants, a great deal of control over both the process and outcome
of school desegregation cases.7 In fact, judges in school desegregation
cases are in many respects acting as they would in any routine private
law case, thereby calling into question the continued relevance of
Chayes's model to school desegregation.8 In so doing, the judges
have allayed, to no small degree, many of the criticisms of their role
in school desegregation. 9
The current role of district court judges is the subject of Part I of
this Article, which examines a ten-year period of district court
Part II argues that the district court judges have
opinions.
relinquished even more power than is compelled by the admittedly
pro-defendant standards developed by the Supreme Court. 10
Although the Supreme Court's jurisprudence directs that the return
of local control be a guiding principle in school desegregation cases
today, the Court still requires a commitment to the elimination of
vestiges of discrimination that are caused by the defendant and can be
Yet district courts have ignored this
practically redressed. 1
are willing to accept lingering
courts
Today
responsibility.
segregation that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence prohibits. 2 This
is due in part to a fatigue in the efforts to desegregate. 3 Part II
concludes with an examination of an exception to the pattern
identified in Part I-two district court judges in Alabama who have14
taken an active role in overseeing their school desegregation cases.
Through their efforts, school desegregation suits are being dismissed,
but only after thorough and relatively successful desegregation
efforts.
operation of public institutions, e.g., school desegregation, the rights of institutionalized
persons, public housing discrimination, police and fire department employment, and
voting rights.
6. Perhaps, however, the degree of power has long been overstated. See infra note
97 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Parts I.A, I.D.
8. See infra notes 28-35, 97-113 and accompanying text. In contrast to public law, I
use the term "private law" to include litigation concerning private rights of private parties,
such as contracts, torts, or property. See Chayes, supra note 5, at 1282-83. The form of
private law litigation is further explained infra note 20 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra notes 125-41 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 145-60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part ll.B.
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I. THE ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
Proponents and opponents of school desegregation once agreed
that district court judges controlled their school desegregation cases
in a way very different from the run-of-the-mill, private lawsuit. 5
Their disagreement concerned the legitimacy of that judicial power,
not whether the power was exercised.16 For example, a prominent
proponent, Professor Chayes, described the judge in public law
litigation as setting the issues for the parties to explore and actively
developing the factual record. 7 Moreover, because any number of
particular remedies could be ordered (given that no particular
remedy was legally compelled by the violation),18 the judge, rather
than any legal principle, was crucial in determining the contours of
the remedy. 19 This stood in contrast to private law litigation, where
the judge ruled on matters initiated by the parties, on records entirely
developed by the parties, and according to established legal
principles.2z For Chayes, the judge in public law litigation had
"passed beyond even the role of legislator and ha[d] become a policy
21
planner and manager.
Opponents of public law litigation largely agreed with Chayes's
description of the judge, but questioned the legitimacy of judges
taking such an active role in shaping the litigation and deciding policy
issues rather than neutrally applying legal principles to matters
identified and developed by the parties.2 By interjecting themselves
into the minutiae of school administration, the argument went, judges
were acting more like school superintendents or legislators than
judges.23
At least among some conservatives, judges are still

15. See supra notes 1-5.
16. But see Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 481-91 (1980) (arguing
that judges in probate, bankruptcy, and other private law cases exercised similar power as
is exercised in public law cases).
17. See Chayes, supra note 5, at 1296-98.
18. For example, in deciding how to desegregate the student body, one could choose
from any number of methods, which are not mutually exclusive, including busing, transfer
policies, choice methods, geographic attendance zones, school building structure, school
construction, or school closure. These broad choices then break down into an amazing
number of implementation options. For a description of traditional and nontraditional
school desegregation

remedies, see DAVID J. ARMOR,

FORCED JUSTICE:

DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 11-16,161-63, 166-69 (1995).

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Chayes, supra note 5, at 1300-01.
See id. at 1282-83.
Id. at 1302.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2, infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.

SCHOOL
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perceived as impermissibly micromanaging school systems.
Professors Richard Epstein24 and John Choon Yoo, 25 for example,
have recently criticized judges for intruding upon the authority of the
26
states and other federal branches, as have Justice Clarence Thomas
and even occasionally Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.27
This Article's study of the role of district court judges today,
however, calls into serious question the characterization of judges
behaving in ways atypical of judges but typical of the legislative and
executive branches and state and local governments. The study, as
explored in more detail below, 28 reveals that school desegregation
cases today follow a process common in most private law litigation,
but very different from that normally attributed to school
desegregation and other types of public law litigation. 29 The parties
initiate the matters to be decided by the court" and often propose a

24. Richard A. Epstein, The Remote Causes of Affirmative Action, or School
Desegregationin Kansas City, Missouri,84 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1103-04 (1996) (contending
that school desegregation remedies continue to exceed the judiciary's capacity and
concern matters best governed by local school districts).
25. Professor John Choon Yoo has argued that school desegregation remedies violate
separation of powers, are ineffective, and abuse federal power. See Yoo, supra note 2, at
1138-41.
26. Justice Thomas has claimed that public law remedies should be rejected or
severely limited for lack of judicial competency and for violating federalism, separation of
powers, and the Eleventh Amendment. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 385-93 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131-33, 132 n.5 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring). He specifically has argued that courts should terminate
jurisdiction because it "inject[s] the judiciary into the day-to-day management of
institutions and local policies-a function that lies outside of our Article III competence."
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 135 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 391-92
(Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the district court's usurpation of prison officials'
authority).
27. In Jenkins, Justice O'Connor evidenced some agreement with Justice Thomas's
arguments regarding federalism and separation of powers. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 112-13
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The necessary restrictions on our jurisdiction and authority
contained in Article III of the Constitution limit the judiciary's institutional capacity to
prescribe palliatives for societal ills.").
28. See infra Part I.
29. The one major difference between public law and private law remedial process
continues to be the sustained jurisdiction of courts after the remedy is declared. See
generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II) (retaining jurisdiction
during the transition to desegregated public schools). In private law cases, judicial
oversight essentially ends with the pronouncement of the remedy, while in public law cases
jurisdiction continues through the enforcement of the remedy. See id. at 301. Although
maintaining judicial involvement in public law cases continues today, its impact is abating
in school desegregation as school districts are declared unitary and their suits dismissed.
For a definition and discussion of unitary status, see infra notes 50, 125-44 and
accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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settlement crafted with minimal judicial involvement.3' The litigation
process, in short, is controlled by the parties just like in the typical
private law lawsuit. The primary difference in judges' actions in
school desegregation and private law litigation is that the outcome of
the process is largely deferential to defendants' preferences.3 2 In
other words, defendants are very likely to win.
The end result is that district court judges have ceded to the

parties, particularly the defendants, the power the judges once held,
or at least once attributed by many to judges.33 The process is entirely
party initiated and driven, and defendants' desired outcome is
typically awarded. Gone is the day of the judge as the "dominant
figure." As a result, we must rethink the description of the judges as
controlling the process and outcome of school desegregation cases.34
As discussed in more detail below, this argument only reaches the
role of judges. I readily admit the obvious: school desegregation
litigation itself has a profoundly different impact than routine private
law litigation.35

The current role of district court judges is revealed in a study of
written district court opinions officially published or electronically
available over a ten-year period from June 1, 1992 to June 1, 2002.36
31. See infra Part I.C.
32. See infra Part I.A. Most cases are governed by the case-selection effect theory or
expectations model, which predicts plaintiffs and defendants each win half the time. See
infra note 60. The deference afforded to defendants in school desegregation cases is not
found in private liability standards, as is true for the explicit deference afforded to school
administrators in liability standards developed for "[situdent free speech, Fourth
Amendment, and due process rights." See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public
Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1338 (2000). Instead, there is a deference to defendants'
preferences as to remedies and, relatedly, the declaration of unitary status. See infra Part
I.A.
One exception has, however, occurred. Courts have rejected school districts'
preferences not to be declared unitary so that the school districts could continue raceconscious student assignment practices. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
34. In addition, Linda S. Mullenix has questioned the applicability of Chayes's model
to newer types of litigation such as mass tort litigation. See Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving
Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33
VAL. U. L. REV. 413,421 (1999).
35. See infra text following note 121.
36. The school desegregation opinions were collected from both Lexis and Westlaw,
commonly used empirical tools. See Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in
Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1, 24 n.139 (1998). Lexis and Westlaw
electronically publish opinions designated by the court for official publication and
opinions not designated by the court for official publication. Frequently included in this
latter category are complex litigation cases such as school desegregation. I included
officially unpublished opinions available on Lexis and Westlaw in hopes of providing as
complete a picture as possible. No other sources provide more opinions in school
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An analysis of the resulting eighty-four opinions, concerning the
desegregation of fifty-three school districts, clearly demonstrates the
following four points:3" (1) defendants win when they are sued for
traditional school desegregation issues; 38 (2) defendants lose on
significant issues only when their race-conscious student assignment
policies are challenged or when defendants oppose each other;39 (3)
parties often settle;" and (4) the process of school desegregation cases
further minimizes the role of the judiciary.4
A.

When Defendants Win

First and foremost, defendants usually win when minority
parents and students and/or the United States are suing school
authorities for desegregation.4" This is particularly true after appeals
are taken into account. The following table summarizes the thirtyeight opinions covering this situation:

desegregation cases, other than contacting each court's clerk of court for copies of
opinions. The searches were conducted on the district court databases offered by Lexis
and Westlaw. The search term used for Lexis was <school desegregation>. In Westlaw,
the search term was <school /p desegregation>. Both searches had date restrictions of
June 1, 1992 to June 1, 2002.
From the Lexis and Westlaw searches, included were cases concerning the
disestablishment of primary and secondary education segregation prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Excluded from the survey were
opinions concerning matters which reveal little about the settlement or success rates of
plaintiffs and defendants on school desegregation matters. This exclusion primarily
applied to requests for attorneys' fees and intervention. Although these two issues can
have profound implications on school desegregation cases, the issues are too narrow to
reveal much about the process of addressing school desegregation issues and the power of
the judge and the parties.
For the limits on relying on written opinions, see Wendy Parker, The Future of
School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157, 1195-97 (2000). The most notable limit
applicable here is the possibility that judges are influencing parties through oral means
that are not reflected in their written work.
37. I also compiled information regarding the judges who heard the cases and the
President who appointed each judge. No pattern emerged regarding how the judges
handled the cases and the President by whom they were appointed.
38. See infra Part I.A.
39. See infra Part I.B.
40. See infra Part I.C.
41. See infra Part I.D. By process, I mean the very minor role judges play in
supervising and controlling the course of the litigation.
42. Excluded from this section are instances of the plaintiffs seeking the end to the
desegregation decree and the defendants opposing each other. Both situations are
discussed infra Part I.B.
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Table 1. Win/Loss Rates in Thirty-Eight Opinions in Which Plaintiffs
and Defendants Disagree About Traditional School Desegregation
Issues.
Litigation Stage

Defendant Loses 43
in Full Percentage
44
(Raw Number)

Defendant Wins in
Part Percentage
45
(Raw Number)

Defendant Wins
in Full Percentage
46
(Raw Number)

Before District
Court
After Appeals, If
Any, Completed

18% (7)

24% (9)

58% (22)

16% (6)

13% (5)

71% (27)

The table actually inflates the import of plaintiffs' victories. In
seven opinions defendants lost entirely, producing a victory rate of

eighteen percent for the plaintiffs, but all the wins involved narrow
issues such as the assignment of only a handful of students, or, at
most, the closure of a small school. 47 Only one opinion was appealed,

and the court of appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing on one
48
of the issues on which defendants lost.

43. Included as a loss in part or in full are instances in which a court refuses to adopt
defendant's preferred proposal entirely or anytime it appears at all possible that the court
was not adopting the defendant's proposal wholesale. For example, counted as a loss in
part was the court's approval of defendant's proposed remedy made as an alternative to
another proposed remedy. See Stanley v. Darlington County Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.4:627749-22, 1996 WL 294369, at *3 (D.S.C. May 24, 1996). Also included as a loss in full were
instances where it was unclear how the remedy was devised. See Lee v. Chambers County
Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A.844-E, 1994 WL 241165, at *2-*4 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 16, 1994).
44. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
47. See Berry v. Sch. Dist., 141 F. Supp. 2d 802, 803 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (City of
Benton Harbor) (granting plaintiffs' motion in limine); Lee v. Autauga County Bd. of
Educ., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1200 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (denying defendants' petition to close
small African-American high school); Stanley v. Darlington County Sch. Dist., 915 F.
Supp. 764, 772 (D.S.C. 1996) (involving minor student assignment issue to magnet high
school); Lee v. Chambers County Bd. of Educ., 1994 WL 241165, at *2-*3 (resolving
interdistrict transfers among three school districts primarily through consent decree, with
court deciding unresolved issues); Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ.,
Nos. 1816-1822-SLR, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20548, at *1-*2 (D. Del. Aug. 29, 1994) (Red
Clay Consolidated School District) (involving a "discreet and narrow" student assignment
issue); Fisher v. Lohr, 821 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 (D. Ariz. 1993) (Tucson Unified School
District No. 1) (denying defendant's petition for approval of school closure); Liddell v. Bd.
of Educ., 795 F. Supp. 930, 932 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (City of St. Louis, Missouri) (maintaining
its supervisory role over student assignment issues), remanded, 988 F.2d 844 (8th Cir.
1993) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing on one issue).
48. See Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 988 F.2d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1993) (City of St. Louis,
Missouri) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing).
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In the partial victory for defendant category, defendants suffered
partial, but minor, losses in three opinions.49 In six separate opinions,
three other school districts suffered substantial, partial losses before
the district court on important remedial issues and on "unitary status"
petitions.5 0 But the two school districts who appealed their significant
losses then won on appeal and were declared fully unitary.5 '
By contrast, fifteen school districts won twenty-two contested
motions entirely, a total win rate of fifty-eight percent. These wins
covered substantial issues, including ten unitary status petitions, 52 six
49. See Citizens Concerned About Our Children v. Sch. Bd., 966 F. Supp. 1166, 1177
(S.D. Fla. 1997) (Broward County, Florida) (finding individual plaintiffs lacked standing
to pursue compensatory damages but had standing on all other matters), affid in part,
appeal dismissed in part, 193 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999); Stanley v. Darlington County Sch.
Dist., No. CIV.A.4:62-7749-22, 1996 WL 294369, at *3 (D.S.C. May 24, 1996) (involving
student assignment to magnet high school of less than twenty students); Stanley v.
Darlington County Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp 1341, 1368-69 (D.S.C. 1995) (same), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 84 F.3d 707, 710-11 (4th Cir. 1996).
50. Unitary status is the end point of school desegregation litigation. Once a school
district is determined to have converted from "black schools" and "white schools" to "just
schools," the district is deemed unitary and the case should be dismissed. Green v. County
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968) (New Kent County); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237, 246 (1991) (Oklahoma City) (holding that courts should use the word "unitary"
to describe a school system which "has been brought into compliance with the command
of the Constitution"). The standards for unitary status are discussed in more detail infra
notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
The Rockford School District lost on significant liability and remedial issues. See
People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., No. 89-C-20168, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17988, at *36-*38 (N.D. II. Aug. 11, 2000) (remedy), rev'd, 246 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir.
2001); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., No. 89-C-20168, 1996 WL 364802, at
*1-*2 (N.D. Il.June 7, 1996) (remedy), afJd in part, rev'd in part, 111 F.3d 528, 541 (7th
Cir. 1997); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 851 F. Supp. 905, 908 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (liability), affd in part, rev'd in part, 111 F.3d 528, 541 (7th Cir. 1997).
The Hillsborough County School District in Florida and a small Pennsylvania
school district were declared only partially unitary. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 118 F.
Supp. 2d 577, 579 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (awarding partial unitary status to the Woodland Hills
School District); Manning v. Sch. Bd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (Hillsborough
County, Florida), clarified in part, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (M.D. Fla. 1998), rev'd, 244 F.3d 927
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 824 (2001).
51. See supra note 50 for citations to the four appellate reversals in favor of the
Rockford School District and the Hillsborough County School District. The Woodland
Hills School District did not appeal.
52. See Berry v. Sch. Dist., 195 F. Supp. 2d 971, 973 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (City of
Benton Harbor); Jacksonville NAACP v. Duval County Sch. Bd., No. 85-316-Civ-J-10C,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15711, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 27, 1999), aft'd, 273 F.3d 960, 962 (11th
Cir. 2001); Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d 705, 708-09 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (Cleveland City
School District), affd, 215 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir. 2000); Mills v. Freeman, 942 F. Supp. 1449,
1452 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (DeKalb County School System); Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp.
1533, 1558 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (Cleveland City School District), affd, 179 F.3d 453 (6th Cir.
1999); Arthur v. Nyquist, 904 F. Supp. 112, 118 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (City of Buffalo); Keyes
v. Cong. of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1275 (D. Colo. 1995) (Denver School
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important remedial decisions, 3 and six minor remedial issues. 4
Plaintiffs appealed seven of these decisions but lost every appeal.55
The following table summarizes the results of the written opinion
survey if the opinions concerning minor issues are omitted:

District No. 1), appeal dismissed, 119 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Coalition to Save Our
Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 901 F. Supp. 784, 785 (D. Del. 1995) (Brandywine School
District, Christina School District, Colonial School District, Red Clay Consolidated School
District), affd, 90 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1996); Stell v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 860 F. Supp. 1563,
1583 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (City of Savannah and County of Chatham); Tasby v. Woolery, 869
F. Supp. 454, 456 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (Dallas Independent School District).
53. See Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 783 (W.D. Ky.
1999) (allowing defendant-supported-race-conscious policy to continue until unitary status
determined); Ho v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 965 F. Supp. 1316, 1318 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(denying plaintiff's challenge to race-conscious programs supported by school district on
summary judgment), appeal dismissed, 147 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 1998); Vaughns v. Bd. of
Educ., 941 F. Supp. 579, 584 (D. Md. 1996) (Prince George's County) (approving
significant modification to race-conscious admission standards for magnet school); Lee v.
Macon County Bd. of Educ., 914 F. Supp. 489, 496 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (approving
Tuscalloosa City Board of Education's proposed facilities plan); Lee v. Geneva County
Bd. of Educ., 892 F. Supp. 1387, 1396 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (granting county school board's
petition to eliminate of grades six through twelve from the school district, with students to
be educated in the adjoining school district); United States v. Charleston County Sch.
Dist., 856 F. Supp. 1060, 1061-65 (D.S.C. 1994) (holding a school district not liable for
segregation).
54. See Berry v. Sch. Dist., No. 4:67-cv-9, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8256, at *2-*4 (W.D.
Mich. April 30, 2002) (City of Benton Harbor) (denying plaintiffs motion in limine); Tasby
v. Gonzalez, 972 F. Supp. 1065, 1066-67 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (Dallas Independent School
District) (involving a variance in faculty assignment ratios); Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp.
1459, 1471 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (Cleveland City School District) (dismissing plaintiffs'
motion for recusal of judge), affd, 179 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1999); Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F.
Supp. 1485, 1486-90 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (Cleveland City School District) (denying motion
to vacate order); Tasby v. Edwards, 807 F. Supp. 421, 424-26 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (Dallas
Independent School District) (granting school district's request for court approval of
downsized supermagnet school); Tasby v. Edwards, No. CIV.3:4211-H, 1992 WL 367840,
at *1-*2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 1992) (Dallas Independent School District) (granting school
district's motion to relocate school).
55. See supra notes 52-54.
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Table 2. Win/Loss Rates in Twenty-Two Opinions in Which
Plaintiffs and Defendants Disagree on Significant Issues.
Litigation Stage
Before District
Court
After Appeals, If
Any, Completed

Defendant Loses in
Full Percentage
(Raw Number)

Defendant Wins in
Part Percentage
(Raw Number)

Defendant Wins in
Full Percentage
(Raw Number)

0% (0)

27% (6)

73% (16)

0% (0)56

5

5% (1)

95% (21) 5

Thus, in ten years of written, published opinions, only one school
district suffered any significant loss: a small school district in
Pennsylvania was declared only partially unitary, despite its request
for full unitary status.59

Defendants' overwhelming victory rates reveal the following.6'
First, the study demonstrates that courts are not substituting their
56. Each time the defendant lost in full, the matter concerned a minor issue. See
supra notes 43-44, 47-48 and accompanying text.
57. Although in six opinions the defendant lost in part on a significant issue, five of
those opinions were reversed on appeal. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
58. Defendants won in full on significant issues in sixteen opinions before the district
court. See supra notes 52-53. All cases that were appealed were affirmed. Id.
Defendants appealed five opinions in which they had partial losses on a significant issue
before the district court, and each opinion was reversed on appeal. See supra note 57.
Thus, after appeals are taken into account, defendants won in twenty-one opinions.
59. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 118 F. Supp. 2d 577 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (Woodland Hills
School District); supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
60. This type of study calls into question what Professor Theodore Eisenberg labels
the "case-selection effect theory," also known as the expectations model. Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the
Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction,83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 588 (1998).
This is the idea that parties select to contest only disputes unclear in outcome, i.e., matters
in the "gray zone." Under this theory, one would expect the win/loss rates to favor neither
the defendant nor the plaintiff and to be evenly split between plaintiff victories and
defendant victories, or converge on a 50/50 outcome as the law becomes clear and known.
See id. at 588-91. The theory would predict that plaintiffs would quit contesting more
issues as the plaintiffs' chances for success decreased. If the law favors the defense point
of view, then plaintiffs would have little incentive to litigate that issue. For citations to key
scholarship, see id. at 588 n.21.
Thus, the case-selection effect theory would predict that the number of school
districts granted unitary status would equal (or would be converging toward equal results
as shifts in the law became clear) the number of school districts denied unitary status. This
result was not found in the study in this Article. The theory presumes a rationality likely
absent from cases concerning issues as emotionally and politically charged as race and
education. Parties may expect a loss, but still want to protest a perceived injustice. The
same was likely true for the defendants in the 1970s, when defendants continued to
litigate, but faced frequent losses on the issue of liability. This suggests that a look at the
entire history might produce a more evenly split win/loss ratio. Even if this were true, and
I am far from certain that it is, the point of this Article is that, presently, defendants win at
overwhelming rates, particularly for significant issues, and plaintiffs still choose to litigate
in the face of unfavorable precedent.
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judgment for that of the defendants. Rather than acting like school
superintendents, judges are deferring to school superintendents. As
argued below, this level of deference is certainly consistent with
Supreme Court precedent. 61 The Supreme Court has held that
federal courts must be mindful of the importance of local control and
deference to state and local government defendants. 62 Yet, this level
of deference is certainly not compelled by Supreme Court precedent.
The Court's approach is so indeterminate that it could validate any
number of approaches to ending school desegregation cases, 63 as
demonstrated by two district court judges in Alabama.'
In short,
district court judges have chosen to defer to defendants. Further, and
less obvious, at least some of the time plaintiffs continue to value
school desegregation litigation as worthy of their time and energy.
Plaintiffs have continued to litigate these cases and, at times, oppose
65
the defendants, even when faced with almost certain loss.
B.

When Defendants Lose

Defendants lose in two situations. The first is when parents and
students challenge defendants' race-conscious student assignment
policies. In two contested unitary status proceedings, plaintiffs
requested unitary status so that race-conscious policies would end,
while the school districts denied that they were unitary.6 6 Both school
districts were still deemed unitary. 6 This occurred in CharlotteMecklenburg as a white father challenged the race-conscious student
assignment policies that kept his daughter out of the school he
preferred.6 8 In addition, African-American plaintiffs in Lexington,
Kentucky challenged a magnet school's race-conscious policy that
kept desks empty as African-American students remained on waiting
lists. 69 Even though the defendants argued otherwise, the school
61. See infra Part II.A.
62. See infra Part II.A.
63. See Epstein, supra note 24, at 1104, 1111-13; Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court
and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 513-22
(1999); see also infra Part II.A.
64. See infra Part I.B.

65. Perhaps plaintiffs do so just as people buy lottery cards. The potential payoff may
be considered worth the time and expense despite the long odds.
66. Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 359 (W.D. Ky.
2000); Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 232 (W.D.N.C.
1999), aJd in part and rev'd in part, 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).

67. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
68. Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
69. Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 377. A similar situation in Prince George's County

led to a consent decree eliminating the race-conscious student assignment practices. See
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districts were still declared unitary. This suggests at least one of three
explanations: (1) unitary status is easily granted; (2) the school
districts had meaningful desegregation of their schools; and/or (3) the
legal system is hostile to race-conscious assignment practices. The
court's deference to the defendants when the plaintiffs oppose unitary
status, as discussed in the preceding section, appears entirely absent
in this context."v Here courts readily rule against defendants on
71
substantial issues.
Second, defendants lose when they oppose each other. This
occurs in two situations: when the state is also a party and financially
liable for a portion of the desegregation costs or, even rarer, when a
school district asserts a claim against another school district. 2 This
pattern was found in ten school desegregation cases, which produced
twenty-four opinions, or twenty-eight percent of the cases in the
written opinion study. 3 By the very nature of these disputes, when
Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ., 18 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572-73, 580 (D. Md. 1998) (Prince George's
County).
70. For a fuller discussion of the tendency of courts to second guess educators in the
affirmative action context but not in the school desegregation context, see Wendy Parker,
Federalism, Equal Protection, & Public Schools (Mar. 6, 2003) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
71. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
72. This typically arises in cases concerning proposed consolidations of school districts
or student transfers between schools.
73. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 123 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Brinkman v. Gilligan, 85 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (Dayton Board of Education);
Jenkins v. Sch. Dist., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (Kansas City, Missouri); United
States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 7 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v.
Yonkers Bd, of Educ., 984 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Jenkins v. Missouri, 965 F. Supp.
1295 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (Kansas City, Missouri School District); Lee v. Lee County Bd. of
Educ., 963 F. Supp. 1122 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 960 F. Supp.
96 (W.D. La. 1997); Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (Kansas City,
Missouri School District), afTd, 122 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Yonkers Bd.
of Educ., No. 80Civ.6761(LBS), 1997 WL 311943 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1997); Little Rock Sch.
Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 934 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Ark. 1996); United
States v. City of Yonkers, 888 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 96 F.3d 600 (2d Cir.
1996); United States v. City of Yonkers, 880 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 96 F.3d
600 (2d Cir. 1996); Stanley v. Darlington County Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp. 1341 (D.S.C.
1995); Lee v. Chambers County Bd. of Educ., 849 F. Supp. 1474 (M.D. Ala. 1994); United
States v. City of Yonkers, 833 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 770420-CV-W-4, 1993 WL 566488 (W.D. Mo. July 30, 1993) (Kansas City, Missouri School
District), affd, 13 F.3d 1170 (8th Cir. 1998); Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4,
1993 WL 546576 (W.D. Mo. June 30, 1993) (Kansas City, Missouri School District), affd,
11 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1998); Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 814 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (City
of St. Louis, Missouri); Bd. of Pub. Educ. v. Georgia, No. CV490-101, 1992 WL 699499
(S.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 1992) (City of Savannah and County of Chatham); Bd. of Pub. Educ. v.
Georgia, No. CV490-101, 1992 WL 322299 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 16, 1992) (City of Savannah and
County of Chatham); United States v. City of Yonkers, No. 80CIV.6761(LBS), 1992 WL
176953 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1992); Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4; 1992 WL
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defendants assert claims against each other, a defendant will lose. In

some of these instances, the defendant school district won;7 4 in others,
the defendant state prevailed.75 In sum, defendants' losses are
confined to the atypical cases in which the defendant opposes the
declaration of unitary status or the defendants oppose each other.
C.

When PartiesSettle

Parties in school desegregation cases often reach agreement. In
twenty-three opinions, or twenty-six percent of the opinions studied,
the parties filed either joint motions or requested approval of consent

decrees.76 Given that the survey only included published opinions,
the rate of settlement is probably at least slightly higher than

indicated by the survey. It seems reasonable to assume that when
parties are in agreement, the court would be less likely to designate
an opinion for publication or write an opinion to be electronically
published, although this absence of publication may not happen too
frequently.77

551568 (W.D. Mo. June 25, 1992) (Kansas City, Missouri School District); Jenkins v.
Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1992 WL 551569 (W.D. Mo. June 17, 1992) (Kansas City,
Missouri School District).
74. See Valley, 960 F. Supp. at 101 (ruling in favor of the school board that had
challenged the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute the state had tried to use to split-up
the school district); Bd. of Pub. Educ., 1992 WL 699499, at *16 (finding state liable for
dual school system); Bd. of Pub. Educ., 1992 WL 322299, at *4 (requiring state to pay 15%
of desegregation costs); Jenkins, 1992 WL 551568, at *9 (adopting school district's teacher
salary proposal).
75. See Jenkins, 959 F. Supp. at 1152, 1179-80 (granting in part the state's motion for
unitary status of school district, despite opposition from the district); City of Yonkers, 888
F. Supp. at 593 (holding the State of New York not liable under the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act), vacated, 96 F.3d 600 (2d Cir.
1996); City of Yonkers, 880 F. Supp. at 245 (holding state not liable under § 1983, Title VI,
and the EEOA because there was no evidence that the state had engaged affirmatively in
pro-segregative conduct), vacated, 96 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1996).
76. See Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ., 980 F. Supp. 834, 841 (D. Md. 1997) (Prince
George's County) (approving a consent decree covering assignment of identified children
on a waiting list for magnet schools); Lee v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 160 F.R.D.
642, 652 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (approving a settlement addressing the future employment of a
high school principal); infra notes 78-80. The twenty-three opinions involved twenty-one
separate cases.
77. In class actions, a federal district court must evaluate any settlement and may
approve or disapprove the proposed settlement. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). The
overwhelming number of school desegregation cases are certified as class actions or
treated as class actions. See, e.g., Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 118 F. Supp. 2d 577, 579 (W.D.
Pa. 2000) (Woodland Hills School District). Because a court must analyze school
desegregation settlements, it is more likely that the court will write an opinion that is
published. See Parker, supra note 36, at 1195-96.
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Most remarkably, the settlements concerned major substantive
issues. Eleven school districts were granted unitary status without
opposition from any party,78 and in one school district, the parties
agreed to partial unitary status and the court granted such status.7 9
Nine other opinions approved major remedial consent decrees,
covering a wide range of matters."

78. See Goodwine v. Taft, No. C-3-75-304, 2002 WL 1284228, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr.
15, 2002) (Dayton Public School System) (adopting the parties' stipulation that the
Dayton public school system is unitary); Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., No.
CIV.A.70-T-848-E, 2002 WL 360000, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 2002) (granting unitary
status to the school district but not dismissing the court orders relating to statewide special
education issues, which only applied to the state); Lee v. Auburn City Bd. of Educ., No.
CIV.A.70-T-851-E, 2002 WL 237091, at *4, *9 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2002) (declaring the
school system to be unitary and noting that there was no opposition); Lee v. Opelika City
Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A.70-T-853-E, 2002 WL 237032, at *10 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2002)
(granting unitary status to the district, but not the state on the issue of statewide special
education issues); Lee v. Butler County Bd. of Educ., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1367 (M.D.
Ala. 2002) (granting unitary status); Davis v. Sch. Dist., 95 F. Supp. 2d 688, 692, 697 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (City of Pontiac) (noting that no judicial action had been taken for twentyfive years and declaring unitary status); Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, Shawnee
County, Kan., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1213 (D. Kan. 1999) (declaring unitary status and
noting lack of opposition by plaintiff); Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., No. 4:72CV100 SNL, 1999
WL 33314210, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 1999) (City of St. Louis, Missouri) (approving
settlement agreement of the parties in favor of declaring unitary status); United States v.
Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 977 F. Supp. 1202, 1227 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (St. Lucie County)
(granting motion for unitary status supported by all parties); United States v. Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 500, Kansas City, Kan., 974 F. Supp. 1367, 1368, 1370 (D. Kan. 1997) (granting
unitary status supported by the government and the school district); United States v. Bd.
of Educ., No. CIV.A.679, 1995 WL 224537, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 1995) (Coffee County,
Georgia) (granting unitary status).
79. See Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A.70-T-845-E, 2002 WL 1268395, at
*11 (M.D. Ala. May 29, 2002) (granting unitary status in all respects except faculty
assignment to two schools).
80. See Johnson v. Bd. of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 2d 944, 945, 947-50 (C.D. 111.2002)
(Champaign Unit School District #4) (approving joint motion by parties in favor of
comprehensive remedial consent decree); Lee v. Butler County Bd. of Educ., No.
CIV.A.70-T-3099-N, 2000 WL 33680483, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2000) (approving
consent decree on statewide special education issues); S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch.
Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (agreeing on elimination of raceconscious admission standards); Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ., 18 F. Supp. 2d 569, 570 (D. Md.
1998) (Prince George's County) (approving a comprehensive plan agreed to by the
parties); Berry v. Sch. Dist., 184 F.R.D. 93, 106 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (City of Benton
Harbor) (reaching agreement on multiple remedial issues); Stanley v. Darlington County
Sch. Bd., 879 F. Supp. 1341, 1419 (D.S.C. 1995) (consenting to comprehensive remedial
plan), rev'd in part on other grounds, 84 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 1998); Reed v. Rhodes, 869 F.
Supp. 1274, 1276 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (Cleveland City School District) (approving final
consent decree); Reed v. Rhodes, 869 F. Supp. 1265, 1265 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (Cleveland
City School District) (tentatively approving agreement); Lee v. Chambers County Bd. of
Educ., 849 F. Supp. 1474,1475 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (approving consent decree on interdistrict
transfer orders).
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In many respects, the prevalence of agreement is not surprising
given the longstanding use of settlement in public law litigation.8"
Further, party agreement may be preferable for any number of
reasons, most notably the likelihood of successful implementation. s2
Yet, it must be recognized that settlement can divorce the judge from
influencing the lawsuit, as the written opinion study has shown.83
The study demonstrated that the involvement of judges in
settlements was minimal. At most the judges would appoint a special
master or mediator to assist the settlement process. s4 The typical role
was simply noting the availability of settlement.8 5 Granted, the
district court must evaluate any settlement for the settlement to be
deemed valid,86 but courts in the study approved every settlement
proposed by the parties.87 No opinion even hinted at the judge
playing the role of "political powerbroker" that Professor Colin Diver
long ago assigned the judges.88 The judges were not attempting to
broker settlements. Even more fundamentally, it appeared that the
judges had no role in determining what areas should be covered by
the negotiated remedy or what the goals of the litigation should be.
81. See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J.
1355, 1367-76 (1991). In fact, Professor Chayes expected that "[t]he negotiating process
ought to minimize the need for judicial resolution of remedial issues." Chayes, supra note
5, at 1299.
82. See generally Sturm, supra note 81, at 1427-44 (recognizing the importance of
parties' participation in successful implementation of public law remedies).
83. One of public law litigation's early and influential proponents, Professor Owen M.
Fiss, opposed the use of settlement in part because it separated judges from their role of
articulating and actualizing public values. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1082-90 (1984).
84. See Lee v. Butler County Bd. of Educ., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1362 (M.D. Ala.
2002) (appointing magistrate judge to oversee discovery and mediate disputes); S.F.
Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1025 (referring settlement negotiations to a special
master); Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., No. 4:72CV100 SNL, 1999 WL 33314210, at *8 (E.D. Mo.
March 12, 1999) (City of St. Louis, Missouri) (utilizing a settlement coordinator); Berry,
184 F.R.D. at 101 (appointing special master to help case move toward termination);
Vaughns, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 579 (appointing a mediator); United States v. Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 977 F. Supp. 1202, 1227 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (St. Lucie County) (utilizing a biracial
monitoring committee to discuss ways of achieving racial harmony and understanding).
85. See S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1024-25 (delaying the start of trial to
allow the parties to finalize a settlement); Vaughns, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 572 (noting "a gentle
push from the Court" to attempt a settlement).
86. See supra text accompanying note 77.
87. Not surprisingly, some considerations of proposed consent decrees were more
thorough than others. Compare Johnson v. Bd. of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 2d 944, 945-70
(C.D. Il. 2002) (Champaign Unit School District #4) (examining carefully the entire
record before approving a comprehensive consent decree), with United States v. Bd. of
Educ., No. CIV.A.679, t995 WL 224537, at *1 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (Coffee County, Georgia)
(granting uncontested unitary status motion with little evidence of reviewing the record).
88. Diver, supra note 3, at 46.
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As a result, the prevalence of settlements further limits the power
that judges are able to exercise over their school desegregation cases.
D. Process
The process of school desegregation cases further minimizes the
role of the judiciary. Not only are cases settled with little judicial
involvement, but the courts are also having little impact on the scope
of the issues to be considered. With the exception of two Alabama
judges who are taking a unique approach to their school
desegregation cases, 9 in only two cases did the district court judge sua
sponte raise an issue in a written opinion. 9° Granted, in oral
communications with parties judges may be influencing what issues
are raised. But the opinions are written as if the court is reacting
solely to the parties' motions, thus supporting the conclusion that
parties are generally driving the process.
The written opinion study also revealed the hidden existence of
the overwhelming majority of school desegregation cases. The
United States is a party to school desegregation cases concerning over
400 school districts, but it is not a party to every case. 91 One
prominent school desegregation expert estimates the pendency of 695
school desegregation cases.92 Yet, a ten-year search of district court
opinions revealed only fifty-three school districts subject to actively
litigated cases. 3 Not one opinion concerned a school district in
Mississippi or Tennessee, where school desegregation decrees
remain. 94 In California, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas, only
one school district in each state was the subject of a written opinion.
This suggests the possibility that many cases are languishing on court
dockets, with either no opinion being written for ten years, or no
89. See infra Section I.B.
90. See Davis v. Sch. Dist., 95 F. Supp. 2d 688, 690-91, 697 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (City of
Pontiac) (raising sua sponte the issue of unitary status); Manning v. Sch. Bd., 24 F. Supp.
2d 1277, 1286-87 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (Hillsborough County, Florida) (same), clarifiedin part,
28 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (M.D. Fla. 1998), rev'd, 244 F.3d 927 (11th Cir. 200 1).
91. See Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Education Section, Open Cases as
of Dec. 19, 2002 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
92. See ARMOR, supra note 18, at 166.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
94. The Department of Justice's list of school desegregation cases to which it is a
party or litigating amicus includes sixty-nine cases in Mississippi and fourteen cases in
Tennessee. See Civil Rights Division, Open Cases as of Dec. 19, 2002, supra note 91, at
28-35, 38-39.
95. The Department of Justice's list of school desegregation cases to which it is a
party or litigating amicus includes forty cases in Louisiana, four cases in North Carolina,
and seventeen cases in Texas. See id. at 23-27, 35-36, 39-41.
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opinion being deemed worthy of electronic or official publication for
ten years.96
E.

Summary and Implications

Perhaps the uniqueness and extent of the power exercised by
district court judges in institutional reform litigation was once
overestimated by both sides of the debate. 97 What seems certain now,
however, is that the model of the all-powerful judge in school
desegregation is outdated. Today, many judges have no power, as
they "preside" over cases with no recent activity. 98 In active cases, the
parties are determining which issues need judicial resolution and are
developing the requisite record. 99 Often the parties resolve the
matter on their own with minimal judicial intervention. 0 When the
parties are unable to settle, the court routinely grants the defendants'
request for a modification of the remedial decree or for termination
of the lawsuit.1"' Because the governing law is universally condemned
for its ambiguity, the courts are not simply "applying" the law," 2
rather, choices are being made. Judicial decisionmaking largely
occurs only when defendants themselves cannot agree and the judge
must decide between conflicting choices presented by the defendants.
It also occurs in the more limited instances when the defendant wants
to use school desegregation to justify its race-conscious student
assignment practices but is opposed by another party.0 3 Thus, judges
rarely "control" the school desegregation lawsuit or the school
system.
96. See generally Parker, supra note 36, at 1199, 1211-12 (demonstrating through an
examination of unpublished docket sheets that many school districts are subject to longstanding school desegregation orders, but that the pending cases have had little or no
activity for years).
97. Many contend, for example, that the focus on the judiciary has obscured the
importance parties and other interested entities play in the public law remedial process.
See generally Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2031 (1994) (noting a number of scholars who have
advocated a party-driven, "bottom-up" approach to litigation analysis). Others have made
a similar but distinct argument: that the power in public law cases is similar to that
exercised in private law litigation. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 491-94
(finding historical, private law similarities to the power exercised in institutional reform
litigation); Sturm, supra note 81, at 1382 (demonstrating that judges in public law cases
often play a role in settlement similar to that performed in private law cases).
98. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
100. See supra Part I.C.
101. See supra Part I.A.
102. See infra Part II.A.
103. See supra Part I.B.
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Through this largely reactive and deferential posture, district
court judges are giving defendants a large degree of control over their
desegregation lawsuits. Granted, defendants' choices are restricted.
First, they cannot change the fact that the lawsuit was originally filed
The lawsuits, and the resulting liability
against them." 4
determinations, were a necessary consequence of defendants' having
de jure segregation (itself a choice), having a federal judiciary
charged with enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause,' and of
defining the Clause as prohibiting de jure segregated schools. 11 6 This
reality is largely free from controversy." 7 The many controversies
surrounding institutional reform litigation, in fact, concern the
remedial process and not the judiciary declaring the violation of de
School districts can, however, seek dismissal of
jure segregation.'
these suits, and their chances of success are great. In the study, all but
one school district that sought dismissal (either in whole or in part) of
their pending lawsuits were entirely successful. 10 9
104. The highly controversial Kansas City, Missouri school desegregation case is an
exception. The school district was originally a plaintiff, but the district court quickly realigned it as a nominal defendant. School Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 442 (W.D.
Mo. 1978) (Kansas City, Missouri), appeal dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, 592 F.2d
493 (8th Cir. 1979). Other school districts have supported the continued pendency of their
suits because of the financial benefits associated with the suits' remedial decrees or
because of the political cover for unpopular decisions given by the remedial decrees. See
Parker, supra note 36, at 1211-13.
105. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
106. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I) (ruling
"that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place").
107. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 81, at 1405 (noting that "the courts and academic
critics acknowledge that the Constitution permits, indeed requires, continued judicial
involvement in enforcing constitutional and statutory norms"); Yoo, supra note 2, at 1166
(arguing that a court can declare a constitutional violation, but "the obligation to impose a
remedy would fall upon the other entities in our national political system: the states, the
Rather, the controversy surrounding the
executive branch, and the Congress").
declaration that de jure segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause centers on the
reasoning for this conclusion, not the conclusion itself. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN
ET AL., WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 44-64 (Jack M.
Balkin ed., 2001) (summarizing criticisms of the reasoning in Brown).
108. Yet criticisms about remedies are often really attacks on the rights at issue. See
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Judicial Power in Ordering Remedies: Civil Rights
and Remedies, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 103 (1991) ("When we hear an objection
to the remedy, it is almost always a disguised objection to the definition of what is due,
and not to the methods used to apply the balm."); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance,
92 YALE L.J. 585, 593 & n.16 (1983) ("Criticism of a remedy ... may reflect criticism of
the underlying right."); Sturm, supra note 81, at 1382 ("At least some of the debate over
the court's proper remedial role is a thinly veiled attack on the prevailing interpretation of
the Constitution.").
109. See supra Part I.B-I.D, notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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Second, the defendants cannot change existing Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Even though that jurisprudence is pro-defendant, it
still confines the options available to defendants. For example, a
defendant will not request unitary status based solely on compliance
with pending remedial orders because the standards for unitary status
require more."' °
Yet, because the standards are largely
indeterminate,"'I the defendant faces a great deal of choice in what
course to pursue.
Taking these two limitations on defendants' choices as true, one
must still recognize that the deference given to the defendants-this
almost universal "deferrer model of remedial process"' 2 -creates a
new approach to the oversight and implementation of school
desegregation remedies. 1 3 Defendants can choose to seek unitary
status, for which their chances of success are high. Defendants can
also choose not to seek unitary status and use the remedial decree for
additional financing or as an excuse for unpopular, but desired,
policy."1 4 When the school district then needs a modification of the
remedial decree, it can usually get that modification, particularly if
the modification is significant. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, face a
more limited choice: settle with the defendant or face a likely defeat
before a court. 5
The judges' current approach to their school desegregation
dockets addresses in part two traditional critiques of the role of
judges in the public law remedy: the competency critique and the
allocation-of-power critique." 6 The competency critique of judges
contends that judges lack the competency or capacity with which to
undertake the necessary policymaking to ensure effective

110. See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.

111. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
112. See Sturm, supra note 81, at 1412. This is the model of "delegating the task of
remedial formulation to the defendants." Id.
113. Others have recognized this trend of a deferrer model of adjudication by the

federal courts in many types of cases and have critiqued it on a variety of fronts. See
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 369 (1990); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 257-65 (1995); Sturm, supra note 81, at 1412.

114. The exceptions are Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Hampton County, where plaintiffs
successfully sought unitary status. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
115. See supra Part I.A.

116. See generally Sturm, supra note 81, at 1403-08 (describing the two critiques).
When defendants oppose each other or defendants oppose unitary status so that they can
continue race-conscious student assignment, then the deference to defendants discussed
here is not applicable.
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remediation." 7 To the extent that one believes defendants have
competency superior to judges to determine the appropriate remedy,
most likely because of the defendants' expertise and control over
school administration, one would welcome the high win rates of
defendants at least on motions addressing the scope of the remedy
and possibly on declarations of unitary status as well.
Another traditional critique concerns the allocation of powers:
the judges are undertaking tasks that are beyond their sphere of
power and within that designated for other governmental agencies. 1 8
The concern is not in the declaration of a violation, but that in the
crafting of the remedy, courts are trampling upon the rights of state
and local governments in the running of their affairs. The Supreme
Court has agreed in part with this federalism critique and has
required that courts "in devising a remedy must take into account the
interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs,
consistent with the Constitution."1' 19
The great leeway afforded to the defendant pacifies some of the
allocation-of-powers critique. By granting a high percentage of
defendants' requests, courts are affording defendants more control
over their affairs. Granted the defendant is placed in the position of
having to ask for permission, and it is entirely possible that the
defendant internally checks itself by asking only for what is
reasonable under the law. Regardless, particularly because the
governing standards are highly indeterminate and ambiguous, 20 much
of the allocation-of-governmental-powers critique is abated when the
defendants are allowed to control the course and outcome of the
remedial process to such a great extent. The power given to
defendants arguably creates in turn its own separation-of-powers
concerns: when the courts defer to the defendants, the courts are not
117. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 17-19, 106-70
(1977) (analyzing the competency of federal courts in school desegregation); MICHAEL A.
REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN

EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 147-74 (1982) (conducting an empirical
investigation of school desegregation cases to determine the legitimacy and competency of
federal courts in public law cases); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-169 (1991) (critiquing the role of federal

courts in integrating public schools). For a description of the debate over the judiciary's
competency in public law litigation, see Sturm, supra note 81, at 1406-08; Yoo, supra note
2, at 1137-38.
118. See supra notes 2, 22-27 and accompanying text.
119. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977). The Supreme Court has
obviously not excused itself altogether from interpreting the Equal Protection Clause in
ways contrary to the preferences of public schools.
120. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
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fulfilling their constitutional role of resolving cases properly before
them."'
It is important to note what this Article does not concern. This
Article addresses only the involvement of judges in the remedial
process, and its thesis is relatively straightforward: district court
judges have crafted for themselves a very limited role, a role that
comes at the expense of the rights of plaintiffs, as explored in the next
section. It does not argue that school desegregation itself does not
have a very different impact on society than routine private law
litigation or that the remedial process itself does not raise serious
separation-of-powers or federalism implications, even with judges
deferring to defendants.
II. THE ABDICATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
This Part explores one possible explanation for the passive role
judges play in school segregation-namely, Supreme Court precedent
that may explain adequately the approach of district court judges.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has aptly demonstrated the Supreme
Court's culpability for the segregation and resegregation of failing
public schools."' I believe, however, that responsibility is not the
Supreme Court's alone. Rather, district court judges must also share
the blame. They have the power and ability to effectuate more
meaningful desegregation of public schools than they have
undertaken. Those who contend that the judiciary lacks the requisite
tools with which to effectuate meaningful social change are
mistaken.12 3
The Supreme Court's standards, while decidedly
allowing continued
segregation
of minority students
in
underperforming schools, still allow for some degree of integration
and redress of disparities in the quality of education. Two Alabama
judges, in fact, have demonstrated the potential of school
desegregation to produce positive change in ways entirely consistent
121. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 113, at 369 (arguing that "[t]he courts' own
responsibilities to the parties before them cannot be acquitted simply by asserting
deference to other branches"); Sturm, supra note 81, at 1406 (contending that federal
judges are assigned the role of determining remedies). But see, e.g., Frug, supra note 2, at
743-49 (arguing that public law remedies sometimes violate separation of powers); Nagel,
supra note 2, at 662-63 (contending that courts crafting school desegregation remedies
raises its own separation-of-powers issue).
122. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Courts' Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003).
123. See STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY
OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 6-13 (1995); HOROWITZ, supra note 117, at
255-98; ROSENBERG, supra note 117, at 39-169.
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with Supreme Court precedent. 12 4 Yet, as reflected in Part I, almost

all district courts have refused to undertake this responsibility.
A.

Supreme Court Standards and District Courts

The Supreme Court has evidenced its desire that school
desegregation orders end now, even if disparities remain and even if
immediate resegregation will follow termination of the lawsuit.125
Further, the award of unitary status seems almost guaranteed by the
results of the written opinion study. After all, even school districts

protesting unitary status are still declared unitary.126 But the Supreme
Court's standards for terminating school desegregation litigation
themselves do not lead to this result.

To be declared unitary, a

defendant faces no easy test. Specifically, a defendant must prove the
following:
[1] defendant's good faith compliance
"with the
1 27
desegregation decree since it was entered;
[2] defendant's
elimination of vestiges of past
discrimination-the present day inequities caused by
' 28
defendant's past violation-"to the extent practicable;'

and
[3] defendant's commitment
to future compliance with the
129
Fourteenth Amendment.

By its terms, the three-part test imposes a heavy burden on
defendants. School desegregation litigation ends not just with proof

of compliance with outstanding court orders. 3 ° Instead, the second
element of the test mandates the elimination of vestiges of past

124. See infra Part lI.B.
125. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 89 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489
(1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,248 (1991) (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma). See
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure to
Achieve Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1014 (1994) (arguing
that after Dowell and Freeman, "the Court is declaring victory over the problem of school
inequality and simply giving up"); Epstein, supra note 24, at 1108 (describing "fatigue" as
"the dominant impulse on the Court"); Mark V. Tushnet, The "We've Done Enough"
Theory of School Desegregation, 39 How. L.J. 767, 767 (1996) (describing Jenkins as the
"we've done enough" theory, comparable to the Civil Rights Cases of 1883). This stands
in stark contrast to the Supreme Court's 1968 ruling that the time for meaningful
integration of schools was now. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968)
(New Kent County).
126. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
127. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50.
128. Id. at 250.
129. Id. at 247.
130. See Parker, supra note 36, at 1167.

1646

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

discrimination.
This requires the district court to examine all
disparities existing in the school system to determine whether they
are caused by the defendant's past violations and, if they are, whether
they can be eliminated practicably.
An analysis of disparities
typically includes an examination of student assignment, faculty and
staff assignment, transportation, facilities, extracurricular activities,
and quality of education.'
The resulting full-scale analysis of the
school system is no easy task because it requires an examination not
just of process-whether the terms of the decree were fulfilled-but
with outcome-whether compliance with the decree was successful in
its goals. To the extent segregation remains, that segregation must be
examined and be found legally justifiable. The desegregation of
schools, to the extent practicable, includes the expectation of the
unitary status standards and also what plaintiffs seek through the
litigation. In other words, the standards center on fulfilling the rights
of the plaintiffs.132
Critically, ambiguity in the test for unitary status exists. The
judicial discretion required by the Supreme Court's standards is
universally recognized. 33 Today, the most difficult issue presented is
causation.'34 Defendants have the responsibility for redressing only
the portion of present day vestiges (which loosely translates to racial
and ethnic disparities) that are attributable to the defendants' illegal
actions.'
Thus, plaintiffs are entitled to their ultimate goal in the
lawsuit-desegregation to the extent practicable-but only to the
extent that current segregation is attributable to the defendants. But
as Professor James Ryan correctly argues, no one knows the extent of
this relationship, not even social scientists who study these
concerns.' 36 No one can tell us how integrated our schools would be

131. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 435 (1968) (New Kent County); see infra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing
Freeman in more detail).
132. See Parker, supra note 36, at 1176-77.
133. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 134 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 503 (Scalia, J., concurring); Kevin Brown, Termination of Public
School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary Status Based on the Elimination of
Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1108-09 (1990); Friedman,
supra note 3, at 747; Parker, supra note 63, at 524-26; Yoo, supra note 2, at 1127, 1132,
1172.
134. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 503-05 (Scalia, J., concurring); Epstein, supra note 24, at
1101, 1117; Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEo. L.J. 279, 280-81 (1997).
135. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101-02.
136. See James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern
DesegregationCases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1671-74 (2003).
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or how students would score on achievement tests in the absence of
the defendants' illegal actions.137 Courts are directed to determine to
what extent defendants are responsible, but the answer is
unknowable. This ambiguity in standards allows, actually even
requires, choice. The Supreme Court's own choices indicate a
willingness to believe that present inequities are not due to the
defendants' illegality. 38 Thus, the Court has excused segregated
schools on the grounds of purely private housing choices 13 9 and racial

disparities in achievement scores for the reason of non-defendant
causation. 40
Another goal competes against this backdrop of ambiguity over
which, if any, disparities are the legal responsibility of the defendants.
This is the goal of local control, which is the idea, grounded in
federalism, that courts should return schools to local governance,
unencumbered by judicial orders. 141 The goal suffers no ambiguity.
Its end result is easily articulated and achieved: dismiss the lawsuit.
Reference to this goal, which centers on the rights of defendants, can
help resolve the question whether plaintiffs' rights have been
vindicated. When in doubt, terminate.
By judicial choice-a choice by which judges largely defer to the
defendants' preferences-district court judges seem very willing to
accept inadequacies in result, even after decades have passed during
the attempt.1 42 At times, the judicial action is entirely consistent with
the Supreme Court's articulated goal of local control and consistent
with the Supreme Court's own approaches to causation. 43 Further, a
court's choice is at least defensible in the area of disparities in
achievement scores or even in the area of student assignment. These
matters are influenced by a wide array of factors beyond the control
137. See John Leubsdorf, Remedies for Uncertainty, 61 B.U. L. REV. 133, 135 (1981)
("But saying that, had it not been for constitutional violations, a given school would have
had 158 white students and 110 black ones is hard to distinguish from writing a treatise on
the habits of unicorns.").
138. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 n.2 (1991) (Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma) (allowing that residential segregation independent of the defendants may be
responsible for resegregation of over half of the elementary schools).
139. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 476.
140. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101.
141. See id. at 89; Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248.
142. See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (Cleveland City
School District) (granting unitary status despite widespread disparities), aftd, 215 F.3d
1327 (6th Cir. 2000); Keyes v. Cong. of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Colo.
1995) (Denver School District No. 1) (same), appeal dismissed, 119 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir.
1997).
143. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
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of the defendants, making the link between defendants' past illegality
and present day disparities difficult. 44 Further, solutions to these
issues are subject to intense, well-meaning, and long-standing debate.
The area of faculty and staff assignment, however, is different.
Here district court judges allow disparities in ways very different from
those allowed under Supreme Court precedent. One of the hallmarks
of de jure segregation was the assignment of white faculty and staff to
schools attended by white children and the assignment of AfricanAmerican faculty and staff to schools attended by African-American
children. 145 Teachers and staff were critical in designating the racial
identifiability of schools. Thus, from early in the history of school
desegregation, courts have required that the assignment of teachers
and staff be racially neutral as part of the elimination of schools'
14
racial identifiability. 1
School districts exercise quite a bit of control over teacher and
staff assignment. Recruitment, hiring, and retention of educators is
not at issue. Rather, only at issue is the distribution of the educators
already employed by the school district. If race is not considered, one
would expect assignment of teachers and staff over time to mirror the
overall employment numbers. Thus, if the school district had a
teaching staff that is seventy percent white, one would expect each
school to have a teaching staff that is likewise generally seventy
percent white. After all, administrators have a great deal of control
over where teachers will teach. 47 Difficulties and complications
inherently present in the student assignment area-developing
manageable busing routes, determining tipping points, managing
demographic change 148-are entirely absent. Even Justice Thomas
has recognized the relatively straightforward nature of faculty and
staff assignment. 49 All that is at issue is which teachers and staff will
be assigned to which school.
144. See ARMOR, supra note 18, at 76-98; Epstein, supra note 24, at 1111, 1115;
Leubsdorf, supra note 137, at 135-37.
145. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT
AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 96 (1979) (describing desegregation of
teaching staffs as "the least visible and most flammable part of the entire school picture").
146. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (New Kent County)
(requiring disestablishment of continued segregation in faculty and staff assignment);
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 394 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc)
(per curiam) (outlining requirements for racially neutral employment and dismissal).
147. School districts can choose to contract these rights away in union contract
negotiations, but the court order would still take precedence.
148. See ARMOR, supra note 18, at 174-80.
149. Justice Thomas has argued that remedies addressing student assignment,
transportation, staff assignment, resource allocation, and activities are "fairly
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Yet, district courts have continually recognized the continuing
identifiability of faculty and staff and then excused that continuing
vestige of discrimination. This is true even though school districts are
not required to have an exactly racially neutral distribution of
teachers. The distribution must be within a stated range-typically a
band of ±15%.11° Thus, if a school district's teaching staff is 30%
African-American, then each school would be expected to have a
teaching staff between 15% and 45% African-American. Even with
this significant allowance-after all, why should the distribution not
be closer to the overall racial makeup if the distribution is truly
racially neutral, courts readily allowed schools to fall outside the
requisite band."' By doing so, the defendants fail to comply with
outstanding remedial decrees and with one of the ultimate goals of
the lawsuit, the elimination of racial identifiability of schools by their
faculties.
Granted, the noncompliance was not startling or egregious. The
clear majority of schools were in compliance.'52 Critically, however,
the overrepresentation always mirrored the student population. This
suggests a pattern of assigning teachers to schools according to the
racial makeup of the student body, a pattern rooted in the system of
de jure segregation. Thus, if the school had an overrepresentation of
African-American educators, then African-American students were

straightforward and [have] not produced many examples of overreaching by the district
courts. It is the 'compensatory' ingredient in many desegregation plans that has produced
many of the difficulties in the case before us." See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 136
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
150. See, e.g., Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 326 (4th Cir.)
(en banc) (upholding district court's use of the 15% variance), reconsiderationdenied en
banc, 274 F.3d 814 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986, and cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986
(2002); Tasby v. Woolery, 869 F. Supp. 454, 470 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (Dallas Independent
School District) (allowing a variance of 15% for teachers and principals).
151. See, e.g., Davis v. Sch. Dist., 95 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (City of
Pontiac) (excusing schools for not complying with the court order regarding distribution of
teachers because the variance matched the racial composition of the student population);
Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 901 F. Supp. 784, 804 (D. Del. 1995)
(Red Clay Consolidated School District) (noting a continuing violation of variances in the
distribution of teachers), affd, 90 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1996); Tasby, 869 F. Supp. at 471-72,
477 (awarding unitary status but requiring, inter alia, additional efforts to address
substantial unequal distribution of teachers). One court even allowed the exclusion of
"schools which serve a specialized student population," although all schools are required
to be desegregated according to the Supreme Court. United States v. Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 977 F. Supp. 1202, 1216 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (St. Lucie County).
152. See, e.g., Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 118 F. Supp. 2d 577, 585-86 (W.D. Pa. 2000)
(Woodland Hills Schools District); Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d 705, 727-30 (N.D. Ohio
1998) (Cleveland City School District), affd, 215 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir. 2000).

1650

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

also overrepresented in the student body. 153 Likewise, if the school
had an overrepresentation of white educators, then white students
were also overrepresented in the student body. 54 In no instance was
an overrepresentation in the faculty not matched by an
overrepresentation of the same racial group in the student body. The
racial identifiability of the schools continued. A "close-enough"
standard was employed, even though that was not the standard of the

Supreme Court.'55 The Supreme Court allows continued disparities
when it is not practicable to eliminate them or when the disparities
are not traceable to the defendants' actions.'56 At no point, however,
did a court discuss whether it would be practicable to eliminate the
continued racial identifiability of teacher and staff assignments, nor
whether the disparity was due to the defendants' conduct. Rather,
there was a simple acceptance that the standards were largely met and

this was enough.
The Supreme Court has consistently held the assignment of
faculty and staff to be an area to be desegregated,' 157 and the area is

relatively straightforward. Yet, district courts have excused the
continual racial identifiability of the assignment of faculty and staff.
In sum, even when the Supreme Court requires desegregation and
even when practicality concerns should be minimal, district courts
allow segregation to continue.

58

After decades of implementation,

one would expect that the distribution of teachers would take a raceneutral pattern, so long as race is not a factor in the assignment. Yet
courts have excused defendants from the responsibility for redressing
153. See, e.g., United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, 974 F. Supp. 1367, 1378-79
(D. Kan. 1997) (noting "significant progress," but continuing to allow overrepresentation
of minority teachers in predominately minority schools and dismissing the lawsuit); Stell v.
Bd. of Pub. Educ., 860 F. Supp. 1563, 1573-74, 1576 n.23 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (City of
Savannah and County of Chatham) (awarding unitary status even though predominantly
African-American schools were disproportionately African-American in their teaching
staffs). But see, e.g., Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A.70-T-845-E, 2002 WL
1268395, at *8 (M.D. Ala. May 29, 2002) (declaring unitary status even though two
disproportionately African-American schools had disproportionately high AfricanAmerican teaching staffs).
154. See, e.g., Lee v. Butler County Bd. of Educ., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1365-66 (M.D.
Ala. 2002) (declaring unitary status although predominantly white school had a slightly
disproportionately low African-American teaching staff).
155. See Tushnet, supra note 125, at 767.
156. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101 (1995) (requiring a causal link between
the remedy and the violation and requiring practicality in any remedy).
157. This rule began in Green in 1969 and has continued in the Court's three most
recent Supreme Court opinions. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 88; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467, 492 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (New Kent County).
158. See supra notes 145-49.
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disparities in teacher distribution, even though the defendants created
these disparities.
The courts' disinterest in requiring desegregation of faculty and
staff may reveal that no party is very interested in the issue. In fact, in
no opinion approving the continued disparities in teacher and staff
assignment did the court note any party's argument that this
segregation should not be allowed. Plaintiffs (and defendants) may
actually desire, for good reason, the overrepresentation of minority
educators in schools with a predominately minority student body.
Yet the facts remain that the Supreme Court has ordered this area to
be desegregated to the extent practicable, the district courts have
entered orders requiring a specific racial distribution of educators,
and ultimately the district courts have excused the defendants' failure
to comply fully with those orders. Further, the Supreme Court has
specifically held that schools cannot consider race on the theory that
minority students would benefit from the "role model" of minority
teachers.'59
If the parties support the concept of continued
segregation of school personnel, then that principle conflicts with the
law and cannot stand.
The Supreme Court once placed an affirmative duty on district
courts to ensure effective remediation, particularly when the
defendants failed to desegregate. 160 The district courts, however,
seem less and less interested in this duty. Echoing the Supreme
Court,' district courts understandably appear overwhelmed with the
task of desegregation and of the pendency of the litigation. 62 Long
159. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (holding that it is not a compelling interest for a school district to prefer minority
teachers so that they can serve as role models to minority students).
160. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) ("In
default by the school authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a
district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school
system."); Green, 391 U.S. at 439 ("The obligation of the district courts, as it always has
been, is to assess the effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation.").
161. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., No. 4:72CV100SNL, 1999 WL 33314210, at *9
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 1999) (City of St. Louis, Missouri) ("The courts are equipped to say
what the law is, and to order that it be obeyed; they are ill-equipped to implement,
especially in fields such as education where judges have no expertise."); Mills v. Freeman,
942 F. Supp. 1449, 1464 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (DeKalb County School System) ("Nothing this
court has done-and nothing this court could do were it to retain jurisdiction
indefinitely-can erase the indelible scar on our nation's history left by the legal
sanctioning of segregated school systems."); Keyes v. Cong. of Hispanic Educators, 902 F.
Supp. 1274, 1307 (D. Colo. 1995) (Denver School District No. 1) ("What has been
demonstrated most clearly is that courts using the adversary system were not designed to
accomplish institutional reform."); Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ.,
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gone are the days of judges being deemed "unlikely heroes. 163
Instead, judges seem exhausted from their decades-long effort and
anxious to terminate their jurisdiction.
B.

The Alabama Exception

The abdication of responsibility by district court judges in school
desegregation cases is not universal. Two judges in Alabama have
taken a unique, proactive approach to their pending school
desegregation dockets. Their approach demonstrates the ability to be

faithful to the Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence
and to effectuate meaningful change.
Starting in 1963, the State of Alabama and each Alabama school

district were sued for de jure segregation." 64 Thirty-plus years later,
the overwhelming majority of the cases in the Middle District of
6
Alabama were still pending, many with little or no recent activity. 1
In response, Chief Judge (then Judge) W. Harold Albritton, III and
Judge (then Chief Judge) Myron H. Thompson, both of the Middle

District of Alabama, began in 1997 to issue orders that required
parties in desegregation cases to examine in detail what steps were
necessary to make the transition to a unitary school district.166
901 F. Supp. 784, 823 (D. Del. 1995) (Red Clay Consolidated School District) ("The
evidence further demonstrates, however, that the delivery of certain aspects of the courtordered ancillary relief has changed in character and scope over the ensuing years.").
One judge went so far as to develop a standard based on Kosovo and Northern
Ireland-that the situation in the school district was acceptable because it "beats by a mile
what this courts hears and reads about the situations in Kosovo and Northern Ireland."
Although this unpublished opinion was reversed on appeal, it speaks to what courts deem
possible within the context of school desegregation-only a better cooperation than the
situations found in war ravaged countries. See Miller v. Bd. of Educ., No. 63-AR-574-M,
slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 21, 2000) (Gadsden, Alabama), rev'd, Miller v. Bd. of Educ.,
No. 00-12224 (llth Cir. Aug. 8, 2001) (per curiam) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
163. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981) (recounting the influential
role of Southern Republican judges in school desegregation).
164. Alabama school desegregation litigation began as one statewide suit. See Lee v.
Macon County Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 745-46 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (per curiam). In
1970, the statewide suit was divided into individual suits for each school district. See Lee
v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 963 F. Supp. 1122, 1126-27 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
165. Only two of the approximately forty school desegregation cases in the Middle
District of Alabama had previously been dismissed. See Carr v. Montgomery County Bd.
of Educ., No. 2072-N, Civil Docket for Case (M.D. Ala. May 28, 1993) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); United States v. Lowndes County Bd. of Educ., No. 2328,
Civil Docket for Case (M.D. Ala. Mar. 13, 1991) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
166. Such orders were issued in all cases not already the subject of active litigation.
Cases which were not subject to formal show cause orders have still followed the process
used for handling the show cause orders.
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The orders resulted in thorough discovery regarding a wide
range of issues, including almost every facet of the schools. 67 The
judges actively promoted the idea of settlement. 68 Magistrate Judge
Charles Coody closely managed the discovery process and resulting
settlement discussions. 6 9 Soon after discovery, all school districts but
one were declared partially unitary by agreement.17 0 Along with
167. See Franklin v. Barbour Bd. of Educ., No. 66-CV-2458, Docket for Case (M.D.
Ala.) (last updated Oct. 11, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Harris v.
Bullock County Bd. of Educ., No. 64-CV-2073, Docket for Case (1st entry) (M.D. Ala.)
(last updated June 22, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Lee v.
Andalusia Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-3105, Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated May
16, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Lee v. Chambers County Bd. of
Educ., No. 70-CV-844, Docket for Case (136th entry) (M.D. Ala.) (last updated Nov. 26,
2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Lee v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ.,
No. 70-CV-3100, Docket for Case (143d entry) (M.D. Ala.) (last updated May 13, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Lee v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., No. 70CV-1054, Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated May 13, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Lee v. Coosa Bd. of Educ., No. 2:70cv3101, Docket for Case (M.D.
Ala.) (last updated Feb. 4, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Lee v.
Dale County Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-1055, Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated
Feb. 12, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Lee v. Daleville City Bd. of
Educ., No. 70-CV-1059, Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated Jan. 28, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review); Lee v. Dothan City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-1060,
Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated Sept. 24, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); Lee v. Elba City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-1061, Docket for Case (M.D.
Ala.) (last updated Feb. 5, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Lee v.
Enterprise City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-1062, Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated
Jan. 29, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina: Law Review); Lee v. Eufaula City Bd. of
Educ., No. 70-CV-3106, Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated Feb. 12, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review); Lee v. Geneva County Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV1056, Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated Jan. 31, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Lee v. Henry County Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-1057, Docket for
Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated Feb. 11, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Lee v. Houston County Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-1058, Docket for Case (M.D.
Ala.) (last updated Jan. 29, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Lee v.
Opp City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-3108, Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated Mar.
13, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Lee v. Pike County Bd. of Educ.,
No. 70-CV-3104, Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated May 20, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review); Lee v. Tallassee City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-3109,
Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated Oct. 11, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); Lee v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-3110, Docket for Case (M.D.
Ala.) (last updated May 20, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The
cases were subject to almost identical discovery requests served by private plaintiffs and
the Department of Justice.
168. See cases cited supra note 167. The judges held frequent status conferences that
would concern many of the cases at the same time. At these conferences, each case's
progress toward settlement was discussed.
169. See cases cited supra noted 167. Judge Coody managed the processes of all the
cases cited in supra note 167.
170. Tallapoosa County Board of Education is an exception. See Lee v. Tallapoosa
County Bd. of Educ., No. 849-E, at 9 (M.D. Ala. July 22, 1998) (consent decree) (on file

1654

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

these declarations of partial unitary status, the parties entered into
consent decrees covering areas yet to be desegregated. The decrees
specified the necessary steps to eradicate continuing disparities in
these areas, with the expectation that compliance with the terms of
the consent decree would entitle the defendants in three years to

dismissal of judicial supervision over these areas as well. 1 ' The
consent decrees went beyond the traditional methods of determining
desegregation, such as student assignment, faculty and staff
assignment, facilities, transportation, and extracurricular activities.'7 2
They also included a thorough examination of many aspects of school

administration, including student assignment to classrooms (i.e.,
tracking and ability grouping); special education, including gifted and
talented education; discipline; resource allocation; salary; curriculum;
drop-out prevention; and graduation rates-the quality-of-education
concerns that the Supreme Court in Freeman v. Pitts'73 found
permissible to examine as well. 74 For the promise of eventual
with the North Carolina Law Review). Some school districts were granted unitary status
only in narrow areas. See, e.g., Lee v. Phenix City Bd. of Educ., No. 854-E, at 10 (M.D.
Ala. Sept. 16, 1998) (consent decree) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(declaring unitary status in transportation); Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ,, No. 845-E, at
10 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 14, 1998) (consent .decree) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (holding unitary status only in transportation). Others were deemed unitary in
more substantial areas. See, e.g., Lee v. Dothan City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-1060,
Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated Sept. 24, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (holding unitary status in facilities, transportation, hiring and assignment of
faculty, and student assignment across schools in June 12, 2000 consent decree); Lee v.
Autauga County Bd. of Educ., No. 3098-N, at 5-6 (M.D. Ala. June 18, 1997) (consent
decree) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (granting partial unitary status for
transportation, facilities, discipline, and salary supplements).
171. The consent decrees each had very similar language based on the concept that
compliance would ensure a declaration of unitary status. For example, in Lee v. Alexander
City, a typical case, the consent decree stated that "[t]he School Board is committed to the
suggested approaches to achieve unitary status in the identified areas and has negotiated
with [t]he plaintiff parties to develop policies and procedures to obtain this objective over
a three (3) year period." Lee v. Alexander City, No. 850-E, at 5 (M.D. Ala. May 20, 1998)
(consent decree) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The consent decree also
specified the procedure whereby unitary status would be determined at the end of the
three-year period. See id. at 23-24; see also Lee v. Butler County Bd. of Educ., 183 F.
Supp. 2d 1359, 1363 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (describing the process in the cases as
"represent[ing] 'a roadmap to the end of judicial supervision' " (quoting NAACP v. Duval
County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 963 (11th Cir. 2001))).
172. These are the so-called six Green factors, named after the Supreme Court case in
which they were identified. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (New
Kent County).
173. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
174. See id. at 492. In Freeman, the Court allowed an examination into quality-ofeducation issues "to determine whether minority students were being disadvantaged in
ways that required the formulation of new and further remedies to ensure full compliance
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dismissal, the school districts were willing to implement a wide range
of programs designed to address disparities in education.
The remedial plans are now starting to come to an end. Most
school districts have been declared fully unitary as a result of these
plans,175 while other school districts necessitated an additional consent
decree to address continuing vestiges of discrimination before being
76
declared fully unitary.
These cases reveal the following. First, the process appears to
have had a more positive impact on desegregation issues than is
typical of school desegregation cases. The cases have led to a
comprehensive examination of the education afforded minority
school children. Data are a powerful tool for social change because
information is a natural beginning point. As a result of the thorough
discovery on educational services, the consent decrees focused more
on quality-of-education concerns than with the racial makeup of
schools.177 In some areas, disparities continued.17
Improvements
with the court's decree." Id. For more analysis of this case, see Parker, supra note 36, at
1168-72; Ryan, supra note 32, at 1372-73.
175. See, e.g., Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A.70 T-848-E, 2002 WL
360000, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 2002) (declaring unitary status); Lee v. Auburn City Bd.
of Educ., No. 70-T-851-E, 2002 WL 237091, at *9 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2002) (same); Lee v.
Opelika City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-T-853-E, 2002 WL 237032, at *9, (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13,
2002) (same); Lee v. Butler County Bd. of Educ., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1368 (same); Lee v.
Ozark City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-1063, Docket for Case (111th entry) (M.D. Ala.) (last
updated Jan. 28, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (same); Harris v.
Bullock County Bd. of Educ., No. 64-CV-2073, Docket for Case (33d entry) (M.D. Ala.)
(last updated Aug. 18, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (same).
176. See, e.g., Lee v. Geneva County Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV-1056, Docket for Case
(M.D. Ala.) (last updated Jan. 31, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(second consent decree entered Feb. 13, 2001); Lee v. Opelika City Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL
237032 (second consent decree entered Aug. 30, 2000); Lee v. Phenix City Bd. of Educ.,
No. 70-CV-854, Docket for Case (M.D. Ala.) (last updated Apr. 9, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (second consent decree entered Jan. 24, 2000).
177. For example, to address participation in extracurricular activities, the Auburn City
Board of Education undertook the following: providing notice about activities to students
and parents, recruiting black faculty members to be sponsors, and monitoring the
participation of black students in extracurricular activities. The district developed a plan
for encouraging minority participation in special programs and extracurricular activities
(golf, tennis, soccer, cheerleading, wrestling and volleyball) including developing a
comprehensive extracurricular activities survey at the high school level. Among the
district's extracurricular initiatives were diversity and sensitivity training, the
establishment of a First Generation College Club, and enrichment activities that
encourage black students to take part in school activities. Lee v. Auburn City Bd. of
Educ., 2002 WL 237091, at *7.
178. See Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A.70-T-845-E, 2002 WL 1268395, at
*8 (M.D. Ala. May 29, 2002) (noting continuing racial identifiability in faculty and student
assignment at one elementary school and one high school); Lee v. Auburn City Bd. of
Educ., 2002 WL 237091, at *6 (remarking that, despite efforts to recruit minority faculty,
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were most notable for quality-of-education issues, particularly the

increases of minority students in honors and advanced programs and
the decrease of minority students subject to suspensions.'79 While the
schools are far from perfect, their improvements indicate that school
desegregation litigation can change schools for the better.
Second, the judges' actions were entirely consistent with
Supreme Court precedent. They focused the parties on the desired
end of the lawsuit: dismissal, but dismissal only after a thorough
examination of the school district and desegregation to the extent
practicable, as the standards require. The primary difference with the

methods employed by judges to handle their cases was that the judges
exercised strict oversight of the process of desegregation. This started
with the issuance of the show cause orders and continued with the
active use of Magistrate Judge Coody to supervise discovery and
assist in settlement. 8 ' The judges held frequent status conferences for
detailed status reports. 8' Detailed, written, and frequent progress
and status reports allowed the identification and resolution of
implementation issues.'82 The judges largely confined themselves to
shepherding the process of desegregation, with involvement in the
substance of the settlements, whether it be the areas covered by or
the specific terms of the consent decrees, apparently confined to
being receptive to what the parties agreed.'83 The judges were merely
requiring that the parties actively litigate the lawsuit-to identify and
resolve issues with the expectation of both desegregation and
dismissal. Through the use of settlement, the judges were also able to
there was no increase in minority faculty hires); Lee v. Opelika City Bd. of Educ., 2002
WL 237032, at *5-*6 (finding a one percent increase in minority faculty hires, despite
efforts to recruit minority faculty).
179. See Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL 360000, at *6 (finding discipline
rates to be racially proportionate, according to 15% benchmark); Lee v. Auburn City Bd.
of Educ., 2002 WL 237091, at *6-*7 (noting an increased participation in advanced
placement classes and the international baccalaureate program for all students and a
dramatic decrease in the disparity in suspension rates); Lee v. Opelika City Bd. of Educ.,
2002 WL 237032, at *7 (finding increased minority participation in honor classes and
advanced diploma program); Lee v. Butler County Bd. of Educ., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1366
(same).
180. See supra note 169.
181. For example, in Lee v. Alex City Board of Education, a typical case, the court held
four status conferences in the year 2000. See Lee v. Alex City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-CV850, Docket for Case (entries 85-86, 87-88, 90-91, 104-05) (M.D. Ala.) (last updated May
17, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
182. For example, the parties in Lee v. Alex City Board of Education filed seven status
or progress reports in the year 2000. See id. (entries 84-85, 87, 89, 93-94, 103).
183. See Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL 1268395, at *11-*12; Lee v. Butler
County Bd.of Educ., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1368; Lee v. Opelika City Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL
237032, at *9-*10.
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avoid the unanswerable question of causation.1 4 Further, the consent
decrees avoided the problem of judges managing school districts and
greatly minimized the separation-of-powers and federalism concerns
associated with detailed judicial orders. In sum, district courts can, if
they so choose, have a positive impact on school desegregation issues.
Exceptions to the passivity demonstrated by the written opinion study
certainly exist.
CONCLUSION

The written opinion study revealed a great deal of timidity by
district court judges in school desegregation cases. They are willing to
let the parties, particularly the defendants, control the process and
outcome of these lawsuits. While this posture may allay some of the
criticisms of the power of judges in school desegregation, the judges'
deference to defendants has come at the cost of plaintiffs' right to
desegregation to the extent practicable and, at times, at the cost of
less than full compliance with Supreme Court precedent. As the
Alabama judges demonstrate, district court judges can use school
desegregation litigation to fulfill plaintiffs' rights, as defined by the
Supreme Court, if they so choose. Further, the Alabama judges'
actions demonstrate not tyranny, but a simple requirement that
parties actively move their cases toward both desegregation and
dismissal. The experience of the Alabama judges suggests that the
current failure in effectuating school desegregation is due in part to
the choices of district court judges.

184. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
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